Abstract
Jerrold Levinson insists on hypothetical intentionalism （HI） in the interpretation of literary works， arguing that the meaning of a literary work is the appropriate readers-optimal hypothetical projection of the author's most probable intentions based on the historical context wherein the text was produced. Levinson distinguishes four kinds of meanings by referencing to and perfecting Tolhurst's theory. In terms of the ontology of literary works， Levinson distinguishes works and texts， comparing his theory with Iseminger's. Levinson also differentiates categorical intention from semantic intention， refuting Lyas's Neo-Wittgenstein view. The distinctions between ordinary communication and literary communication are also clarified when Levinson negotiates with Carroll's actual intentionalism. In these encounters with different theories， Levinson reiterates the importance of context， hypothetical relationships， utterance meaning and the qualities of interpreters. He debates with Stephen Davies and Robert Stecker on some of the mis-conceptualizations of his theory. Levinson's HI is a reasonable alternative to extreme intentionalism and anti-intentionalism. As a pluralist theory of interpretation， HI enables the work to carry multiple meanings full of possibilities， creating an open space for interpretation. Such theory also sets a high threshold for criticism and urges the interpreter to constantly enhance their qualifications.
Keywords
hypothetical intentionalism; literary interpretation; utterance meaning; context; appropriate audience
First Page
127
Last Page
136
Recommended Citation
Chu, Min. 2024. "The Logic of Hypothetical Intentionalism and Relevant Debates： On Jerrold Levinson's View of Literary Interpretation." Theoretical Studies in Literature and Art 43, (4): pp.127-136. https://tsla.researchcommons.org/journal/vol43/iss4/13
