Abstract
Anti-intentionalism always thinks that any commitment to the concept of intention will lead to the fallacy of private language, representatives of which are theoretical samples like Humpty Dumpty-ism. If Intentionalism is to continue to have interpretative validity, alternative concept of intention must be provided to get rid of the fallacy of private language. This paper presents three approaches of intentionalism revival in analytical aesthetics. The first two versions of the intentionalism reactivate the intention in text interpretation in a place, but still make concessions to anti-intentionalism. It is because both of them share the view with anti-intentionalism that language conventions are determinants in language communication and the concept of intentions is a derivative element. Davidson, however, putting intention in a hermeneutic horizon, argues that the essence of language communication is the interpreter’s recognition of the speaker's intention, while language conventions is not the necessary condition for language communication. With the three versions in comparison, Davidson's theory of intention thoroughly gets rid of commitment of language convention. He put intention as the key factor of text interpretation, which could show more interpretative validity than the first two versions in the debate with anti-intentionalism.
First Page
58
Last Page
68
Recommended Citation
Zhang, Qiao. 2018. "On Interpretative Validity of Intentionalism Against Fallacy of Private Language: Based on Levinson, Carroll and Davidson's Approaches." Theoretical Studies in Literature and Art 38, (5): pp.58-68. https://tsla.researchcommons.org/journal/vol38/iss5/11
