Abstract
This article takes Immanuel Kant's concept of "interesse", and investigates its meaning for understanding of Critique of the Power of Judgment. According to Kant, interesse does not mean that the judging subject is disinterested in beauty, but in the real existence of the object of judgment. Within such a frame, the freedom internal to aesthetic judgment is highlighted. Because interest always concerns the real object, aesthetic judgment without interest is free from subjective preference. Under such circumstances, the subject is entitled to the request of the same judgment from others and thus together they reach universal identity. The freedom is the basis of identity between judgment of taste and judgment of morality, and thus beauty is a symbol of morality.
First Page
50
Last Page
57
Recommended Citation
Xu, Xianliang. 2018. "A Reinvestigation of Kant's Concept of "Interesse": A Reinterpretation of the Chief Element of the Power of Judgment." Theoretical Studies in Literature and Art 38, (5): pp.50-57. https://tsla.researchcommons.org/journal/vol38/iss5/1
